Emory Law Scholarly Commons
Emory Law Journal Online

Journals

2020

The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Forensic Accounting and
Testimony--Congress Should Amend "The Daubert Rule" to
Include a New Standard
Victor Nicholas A. Metallo

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj-online

Recommended Citation
Victor N. Metallo, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Forensic Accounting and Testimony--Congress
Should Amend "The Daubert Rule" to Include a New Standard, 69 Emory L. J. Online 2039 (2020).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj-online/3

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal Online by an authorized administrator of Emory Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

METALLOFINAL_4.20.20

4/21/2020 4:28 PM

THE IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON
FORENSIC ACCOUNTING AND TESTIMONY—CONGRESS
SHOULD AMEND “THE DAUBERT RULE” TO INCLUDE A
NEW STANDARD
Victor Nicholas A. Metallo *
ABSTRACT
This Essay attempts to address the current issues and legal implications
surrounding the use of artificial intelligence by forensic accounting experts and
its importance to forensic accounting research. It reviews existing law, proposes
changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence for using artificial intelligence in the
courtroom, and covers emerging technology a forensic accountant may
encounter, such as blockchain, cryptocurrency, “smart contracts,” machine
learning, and algorithmic entities. Finally, the Essay concludes that the changes
to the rules should encompass standards to account for artificial intelligence
reliability and argues forensic accounting experts and all forensic experts are
needed even more in light of this new technology to assist the trier of fact in its
deliberations.
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INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a technological development that will
inevitably impact the law and the forensic accountant as an expert witness. A
forensic accountant, as well as any expert, is essential for the successful
prosecution of cases. Because cases are not always cut and dry, oftentimes
forensic accountants have to ferret out the good data from the bad, which can be
expensive and time consuming. The use of AI may offer a more efficient means
to carry out that task. As a result, courts, practitioners, and forensic accounting
experts will need to adapt to the emerging technology and understand how it will
be utilized by a jury in making decisions.
Because forensic accountants serve the important role as expert witnesses,
the continuous adaptation to AI technology within the legal system will be
relevant and pertinent to forensic accounting research. Furthermore, forensic
accounting research will be impacted by how forensic accountants utilize AI
within a legal environment that is constantly changing. This Essay attempts to
address the various issues practitioners and forensic accounting experts will
experience when involving AI in light of the historical use of expert testimony
in litigation. Although forensic accountants are the subject of this Essay, any
changes to the federal rules would naturally affect all forensic expert testimony
of various stripes whose factual conclusions rely in part upon AI.
Part I of this Essay will examine the Daubert and Frye standards and the
development of Federal Rules 702, 703, and 704. Part II will analyze the
emergence of new technologies, such as blockchain, “smart contracts,” and
algorithmic entities, including their impact on forensic accounting investigation
and testimony. Part III will examine and propose changes to the Daubert rules
to include standards addressing AI and forensic expert testimony. Finally, in Part
IV, this Essay will conclude the forensic accountant is even more needed in light
of this new technology as a necessary intermediary between the data, the
findings, and the jury. This Essay will present an argument that reliance upon
AI alone is insufficient to arrive at just and equitable outcomes.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE; AND THE DAUBERT AND
FRYE STANDARDS GOVERNING FORENSIC ACCOUNTING EXPERT TESTIMONY
An overview and discussion of current legal standards involving expert
witnesses, including forensic accounting testimony, are first presented to
provide context to the proposed rule changes as a result of emerging
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technologies. Expert witness testimony and its admissibility in federal court is
generally guided by Federal Rules 702, 703, and 704. Federal Rule 702 provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion
or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case. 1

Federal Rule 703 is grounded on the notion the expert must be “personally”
involved in discovering and studying the facts. Rule 703 states:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the
expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in
the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or
data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible
for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise
be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the
jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the
opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. 2

Finally, Rule 704 relaxes the “ultimate issue” responsibility that is relegated
to the trier of fact, whether it be a judge or a jury, and gives the expert some
latitude:
(a) In General—Not Automatically Objectionable. An opinion is
not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.
(b) Exception. In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an
opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state
or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a
defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone. 3

Federal trial courts apply the rules guided by the decisions handed down by
the Supreme Court; yet, the granddaddy of these precedents is Frye v. United
States, a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals case decided in 1923. 4 Frye involved an
1
2
3
4

FED. R. EVID. 702.
FED. R. EVID. 703.
FED. R. EVID. 704.
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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appeal from a second-degree murder conviction. 5 Defendant Frye argued the
trial court denied him a defense by not permitting him to use an expert witness
to explain the results of a “systolic blood pressure deception test,” 6 which is the
precursor to the infamous lie detector test. 7 In addition to proffering the expert,
the defendant offered to undergo a test in front of the jury. 8 But the trial court
ruled for the state, reasoning there was not enough scientific support behind the
conclusions of these tests. 9 The court held:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well- recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs. 10

The resulting rule, which many courts have followed, is that any methodology
an expert witness relies upon must be “generally accepted” by the expert
community in the field. 11 But Congress superseded the Frye rule by enacting the
Federal Rules of Evidence, essentially doing away with the “general acceptance”
standard. 12
Fast forward seventy years to 1993, where the Supreme Court of the United
States laid down the bedrock principle in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., guiding lower courts on the enacted rules surrounding
the admissibility of expert witness testimony. 13 Noting the congressionally
mandated evidentiary rules replaced the rigidness of the “general acceptance”
Frye standard, the Court opined:

5

Id.
Id. at 1014.
7
Christine Funk, Daubert Versus Frye: A National Look at Expert Evidentiary Standards, EXPERT INST.
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-versus-frye-a-national-look-at-expert-evidentiarystandards/.
8
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
9
Id.
10
Id. (emphasis added).
11
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
12
FED. R. EVID.; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (giving Congress the power to regulate the
jurisdiction of the courts under the “Exceptions Clause” of Article III.); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 n.6; SARAH
HERMAN PECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44967, CONGRESS’S POWER OVER COURTS: JURISDICTION STRIPPING
AND THE RULE OF KLEIN 1 (2018).
13
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582 (noting the Court’s duty to interpret “the standard for admitting expert
scientific testimony in a federal trial”).
6
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[It] does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits
on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial
judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under
the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. 14

In Daubert, the plaintiffs sued Merrell Dow claiming its drug, Bendectin,
caused birth defects in their children. 15 Merrell Dow succeeded in a summary
judgment motion below on the basis of one expert’s opinion, which in essence
denied the plaintiffs a trial on the merits. 16 The district court held against the
plaintiffs, essentially upholding the Frye standard and reasoning the plaintiffs’
eight experts’ conclusions did not show “general acceptance” within the field. 17
Given all the studies surrounding Bendectin, the district court opined that
the experts’ opinions were “not based on epidemiological evidence [and
therefore not] admissible to establish causation,” 18 which is a question for the
jury. In a products liability lawsuit, such as the one in Daubert, several legal
theories are advanced, including strict liability and negligence.19 “Causation” is
an element of a negligence case where a jury is instructed to find whether a
defendant’s conduct (action or inaction) was a direct and proximate result of the
injury. 20 A jury may also find that a defendant is strictly liable, which means the
defendant is responsible for the tort, for example, the defendant sold or made a
defective product that injured the plaintiff. 21
The district court reasoned the animal-cell studies “could not raise by
themselves a reasonably disputable jury issue regarding causation.” 22 Plaintiffs’
experts’ “epidemiological analyses, based as they were on recalculations of data
in previously published studies that had found no causal link between the drug
and birth defects, were ruled to be inadmissible because they had not been
published or subjected to peer review.” 23 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
14

Id. at 589.
Id. at 582.
16
Id. at 583. Summary judgment motions are pre-trial motions, which are difficult to win due to the high
standards applied by a court. The intent of summary judgment is to balance the time and efficiency constraints
on an overburdened court system with the constitutional rights of a plaintiff to due process and a fair trial.
17
Id. at 586.
18
Id. at 583–84.
19
See generally STUART M. SPIESER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS (1983).
20
Id.
21
In a negligence lawsuit, the defendant has a chance to avoid liability by successfully showing the
defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances. In a strict liability lawsuit, the defendant’s “defenses” are
generally limited.
22
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 584.
23
Id.
15

METALLOFINAL_4.20.20

2020]

4/21/2020 4:28 PM

THE IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

2045

Ninth Circuit affirmed that an “expert opinion based on a methodology that
diverges ‘significantly from the procedures accepted by recognized authorities
in the field … cannot be shown to be generally accepted as a reliable
technique.’” 24 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the Frye test was
superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” 25
The Constitution, the general statement of the federal civil law, 26 supersedes
statutes, and since the Constitution establishes a republic with three co-equal
branches of government, statutes passed by both Congress and the President
supersede common law, or judge-made law, upon which the Frye test essentially
was based. Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that all relevant
evidence (evidence that tends to prove or disprove the probability of a fact in
question) will be admitted by the trial judge for the jury to consider. 27 Therefore,
in a products liability lawsuit, a basic fact in question before a jury is whether
the defendant was negligent, or as in the case of Daubert, in manufacturing and
selling Bendectin. Expert testimony would be relevant to a jury determining
whether Merrell Dow was liable.
The Court noted there is nothing in Federal Rule 702 that mentions “general
acceptance” in the community of the discipline, 28 making the rigid Frye rule
irrelevant in federal lawsuits. But the Court also recognized the gate-keeping
function of a trial judge and acknowledged under the rule “the trial judge must
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable.” 29 The purpose of Rule 702 is to assist a “trier of fact”
(and in most cases, the “trier of fact” is a jury) with the expert’s knowledge and
expertise. 30 The rule is not meant to have courts affirm or disaffirm scientific
principles and methods, or even to act as a check on the scientific method as it
is used within a scientific discipline.
Depending on the case, expert testimony may rely upon scientific
knowledge. 31 The Court reasoned the phrase “scientific knowledge” is not
simply a repository of knowledge of the physical world per se, but scientific
knowledge is a process of knowing, explaining, and validating the physical
world based on “good grounds,” thereby “establish[ing] a standard of
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1991)).
Id. at 587.
The Constitution is primarily based on the natural law, which supersedes civil law or human-made law.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
Id. at 588–89.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 589–90 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
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evidentiary reliability.” 32 Expert testimony, therefore, must grounded in facts
that are relevant to the issues in the case, otherwise it is useless to the jury. 33
The Court used the example of the phases of the moon to explain the doctrine
of relevance. 34 Thus, if a jury needs to resolve how dark it was on a given night
because “darkness” is relevant to a case, an expert’s testimony would be helpful
there; however, an expert’s testimony would not be relevant to the question of
whether it was likely the defendant “behaved irrationally that night.” 35 The
promulgation of Rules 703 and 704, which give the expert “wide latitude to offer
opinions including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or
observation,” lends even more support that the “general acceptability” standard
is moot. 36
Finally, the Court considered whether the expert’s “theory or technique” has
been “peer reviewed.” 37 “Publication (which is but one element of peer review)
is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with
reliability, and in some instances well-grounded but innovative theories will not
have been published.” 38 Some theories are too new for publication or maybe
lack interest by peers; nevertheless, the fact they are not published is not
dispositive as to whether they are relevant or admissible. 39 This is not to say
using peer reviewed methods is not good practice or desirable, since having
other experts in the field review and weigh-in on theories and approaches can
help mitigate flaws in methodologies and improve upon them. 40 Therefore,
“publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant,
though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a
particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised.” 41
Expert testimony must be reliable and relevant, and the legal system has
many tools to ferret out irrelevant evidence. The best tool in an attorney’s arsenal
is cross-examination, which is permitted in court because of the constitutionally
guaranteed right of a party to witness confrontation. 42 Experts proffered by a
32

Id. at 590.
Id. at 591 (citations omitted).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 591–92.
36
Id. at 592.
37
Id. at 593.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 594; Symposium, infra note 48, at 1471 (“Peer review does not guarantee that the method is right
or has been proved.”).
42
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33

METALLOFINAL_4.20.20

2020]

4/21/2020 4:28 PM

THE IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

2047

party will be subject to cross-examination, and their theories and conclusions
will be subject in a sense to the “peer review” of the opposing side’s expert’s
scrutiny. Directed verdicts and summary judgments can end a case early if the
expert’s opinion amounts to net opinions or are deemed irrelevant opinions.
Finally, the appeals process will review whether the trial judge abused his or her
discretion in those determinations.
In addition to the truth-searching procedures and techniques mentioned
above, judges, in their role, serve as “gatekeepers” to the evidence a jury ought
to hear. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 43 the Court reaffirmed a trial court’s
“gatekeeping” function and held the Daubert standard applied not only to
testimony based on scientific knowledge but also to testimony based on
“technical” and “other specialized” knowledge, 44 which includes forensic
accounting. The Court ruled the Daubert factors are not exhaustive and a court
may consider one or more of the factors when performing its “gatekeeping”
role. 45 The reliability test is “flexible,” and the factors may or may not apply to
every expert in every case. 46 But it is worth noting Daubert and Kumho apply to
federal lawsuits and not necessarily state actions. States, therefore, have the
option of accepting or rejecting these standards and some of them have chosen
to keep the Frye standard in some areas and Daubert in others. 47 Accordingly,
what evidence is presented and admitted is generally up to the attorneys and the
court.
In 2018, Fordham University Law School hosted the “Symposium on
Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702.” 48 The focus of the
Symposium was to improve the use of forensic evidence within the court system
in the aftermath of Daubert and Kumho and to consider whether the rules should
be revisited. 49 Panelists reinforced the notion that the relevance of an expert’s
opinion to the case is not enough, but the expert’s analysis must be grounded in
reliable methods. 50 For example, fingerprint and firearms evidence are
considered to be “subjective,” and therefore, several of the panelists believe
empirical evidence is needed to support those findings. 51
43
44
45
46
47
48

526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141.
Id.
Id.
Funk, supra note 7 (list of various states and standards).
Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony Daubert, and Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1463, 1463

(2018).
49
50
51

Id.
Id. at 1467.
Id. at 1471.
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Experts suggested AI could be used to enhance the accuracy of these
examinations and make them more objective. 52 Several experts who participated
in the Symposium focused on the objectivity of data results, where the more
objective the methods an expert used in their review of a case, the less likely
bias would enter the analysis. 53
There was conjecture among Symposium presenters over whether Rule 702
should be changed to account for the changes in technology or whether the rule
is simply being misapplied in terms of permitting experts to opine on things
without sufficient training. 54 For example, statistics, as a sub-discipline of
mathematics, is often used in many of the forensic sciences; however, because
Rule 702 says a witness is qualified as an expert by “knowledge, skill,
experience, [or] training,” statisticians are not permitted to testify as an expert
in biology, for example, where a biologist may be needed to testify about DNA
samples. 55 But a biologist may testify as to “error rates” in the samples. 56
In other words, one of the criticisms is the rule may not prevent all experts
from testifying outside his or her field. 57 But this may present an opportunity for
AI to assist in areas where multiple experts would be needed. Having too many
experts testifying can be confusing to a jury yet having too few can lead to
inaccurate information.
The discussion turned toward machine evidence and its reliability,
particularly how familiar experts are expected to be concerning the functions of
machines. 58 Professor Erin Murphy drew a distinction between machines that
can perform a human function faster, like a calculator, versus “machinegenerated evidence that [does not] actually reproduce or speed up what humans

52

Id.
Id.
54
Id. at 1471–72.
55
Id. at 1472.
56
Karen Kafadar, The Critical Role of Statistics in Demonstrating the Reliability of Expert Evidence, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 1617, 1619 (2018) (“Rule 702 seems to allow any ‘expert’ to draw inferences from data—
which could arise from biased collections rather than from representative samples from the relevant population—
even if that expert’s knowledge of statistics is nonexistent.”).
57
Id. at 1474 (“Courtroom testimony right now does not comport with statistical reliability…. Data
analysis and interpretation do require some statistical expertise, more than a little. One or two courses in statistics
no more makes a statistical expert than my two or three courses in chemistry would make me a chemist. I don’t
believe that nonstatisticians should be allowed to be providing expert testimony when it comes to the analysis
of data. Relying on models is almost always necessary, but it can be tricky, and so you have to look at several
of them. Opinions are not database conclusions, and experts, in my opinion, should be disclosing all the facts
and data related to how they came up with their opinions.”).
58
Id. at 1514.
53
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do, [but] it creates unique knowledge.” 59 Professor Murphy suggested the rules
could be amended to reflect a “Daubert-style test where the machine is the
unique source of knowledge, where the human being might be just a vector
delivering that knowledge, including elevating the ideas of transparency in each
of those pieces and disaggregating all those pieces.” 60 Rule 403, which permits
judges to exclude evidence that may prejudice the jury, could also mitigate
against an expert coming into court and merely relying upon machines as
scriveners of that evidence. 61
The discussions seemed to converge on one general objective: The purpose
of expert testimony and the use of emerging technology is to assist the trier of
fact. Dr. Alice Isenberg, Deputy Director of the FBI Laboratory, summed the
Symposium up best: “[W]e all have the same goal for forensic science—to get
the right answer, communicate that answer to a layperson, and to continuously
improve our ability to get higher quality and quantity information from
evidence.” 62
II. THE IMPACT OF AI TECHNOLOGY ON FORENSIC ACCOUNTING
EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Machine Testimony and the Rise of Algorithmic Entities
Rules promulgated as to how AI fits within the context of a trial must be
guided by the notion of fundamental fairness. The guarantees of fundamental
fairness in trial and judgment in a court of law are set forth in: (1) the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, where persons have a right to be
secure and free from unreasonable government intrusion and interference in
themselves and in their property; (2) the Fifth Amendment, where persons have
a right not to incriminate themselves, a right not to be placed in jeopardy twice
for prosecution of the same offense, a right to a grand jury to review a
prosecutor’s claims, limitations on eminent domain, and a right to due process;
(3) the Sixth Amendment, where persons have a right to a speedy jury trial, a
right to present witnesses and to confront the witnesses against them, to be
informed of accusations, and a right to counsel, and (4) the Seventh Amendment,
where persons have a right to a civil trial. 63 These guarantees are grounded in
natural law.
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 1514–15.
Id. at 1515.
Id.
Id. at 1485.
U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
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In civil cases, the plaintiff must prove legal claims by a “preponderance of
the evidence,” or a small amount of evidence making it more likely than not that
the defendant is liable. 64 In criminal cases, the standard for conviction is “proof
beyond a reasonable doubt,” a much higher standard. 65 Objectivity in factfinding, therefore, is the heartbeat of the judicial system and reducing cognitive
bias should be an aim of expert testimony.
Machine learning is an AI procedure where a “machine has been ‘trained’
through exposure to a large quantity of data and infers a rule from the patterns it
observes.” 66 Machine learning and reliance upon AI in the courtroom is not new.
Some of the precursors to modern-day AI are DNA testing and breathalyzer
analysis, which depend on machine learning. 67 In the past, courts confronted
various types of “testimony” given by “scientific gadgets,” such as “The DrunkO Meter” in the 1940s; and, in the 1960s, courts permitted “the output of
commercially used tabulating machines.” 68 “Proprietary algorithms,” some
specifically designed to be used in the courtroom, including those made to detect
alcohol levels through the use of infrared technology, diagnosing diseases, or
DNA analysis, are routinely admitted by judges. 69
In her article Machine Testimony, Professor Andrea Roth acknowledges the
benefits of AI and machine testimony where the “shift from human to machinegenerated proof has, on the whole, enhanced accuracy and objectivity in fact
finding,” but she warns against placing total reliance upon machine sources
because of the potential biases and inaccuracies contained in the machines’
“black boxes.” 70 The “black box” is a metaphor referring to the machine or

64

See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 495 U.S. 375, 390 (1983).
See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979).
66
Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 679 (2017).
67
Patrick W. Nutter, Machine Learning Evidence: Admissibility and Weight, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 919,
925 (2019).
68
Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1976 (2017).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 1977–78 (“Just as human sources potentially suffer the so-called ‘hearsay dangers’ of insincerity,
ambiguity, memory loss, and misperception, machine sources potentially suffer ‘black box’ dangers that could
lead a factfinder to draw the wrong inference from information conveyed by a machine source. A machine does
not exhibit a character for dishonesty or suffer from memory loss. But a machine’s programming, whether the
result of human coding or machine learning, could cause it to utter a falsehood by design. A machine’s output
could be imprecise or ambiguous because of human error at the programming, input, or operation stage, or
because of machine error due to degradation and environmental forces. And human and machine errors at any
of these stages could also lead a machine to misanalyze an event. Just as the ‘hearsay dangers’ are believed more
likely to arise and remain undetected when the human source is not subject to the oath, physical confrontation,
and cross-examination, black box dangers are more likely to arise and remain undetected when a machine
utterance is the output of an ‘inscrutable black box.’”).
65
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computer’s internal programming. 71 The potential prejudicial effect upon jurors
is that they see only the outputs generated by the AI, but they cannot “peer into”
the system generating those outputs. 72
The danger is the presumption of reliability and credibility jurors may place
on the “testimony” provided by these systems without considering that although
faster and more efficient, algorithms are human-made, and therefore, can be
flawed. Even with the advent of “self-learning machines” there is still no
guarantee of a “zero-error rate” because the genesis of even “self-learning
machines” are human beings who are flawed. Moreover, “self-learning
machines” operate in and take data from an imperfect world, which although
through their power they may achieve error rates closer to zero than that of a
human being, arguably they would never achieve perfect “zero-error rates.”
Forensic accountants will be confronted with these new technologies, which
include blockchain and algorithmic entities. In fact, they are truly considered
disruptive technologies that are affecting traditional financial systems. 73 Adding
another layer of complexity to the situation, algorithms can execute what are
known as “smart contracts,” challenging the notions of traditional contract law:
Smart contracts are just one part of the larger trend of computerized
technologies purporting to displace or replace human decisionmaking.
In areas like hiring, finance, and copyright enforcement, algorithmic
systems are touted for their speed, efficiency, and reliability, unlike
error-prone and potentially biased humans. Indeed, the benefits are
considerable. But it quickly becomes clear that machines are prone to
their own errors and biases. Additionally, the introduction of
algorithmic systems into historically judgment-laden fields creates
challenges for legal and practical accountability. 74

“Smart contracts” can be developed and executed with blockchain technology,
such as the Ethereum platform, which is equipped with its own token. 75
Essentially, a “smart contract” is an algorithm programmed to automatically
execute certain functions when an event is triggered, similar to setting up
automatic payments in a bank account, except the terms of the agreement,
71
Dallas Card, The “Black Box” Metaphor in Machine Learning, MEDIUM (July 5, 2017), https://
towardsdatascience.com/the-black-box-metaphor-in-machine-learning-4e57a3a1d2b0.
72
Nutter, supra note 67, at 924.
73
How the Blockchain Will Impact the Financial Sector, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/blockchain-will-impact-financial-sector/.
74
Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 381 (2017).
75
Learn About Ethereum, ETHEREUM, https://ethereum.org/learn/#ethereum-basics (last updated Jan. 8,
2020).
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including buying and selling of goods, are written into the blockchain code. 76
“Smart contracts” can increase speed and accuracy in commerce, and perhaps
prevent breaches because they self-execute. 77 This makes it easier for forensic
accountants to perform reasonableness checks against AI outcomes. There are
still elements of contract-making that require human judgment, for example, the
“meeting of the minds,” particularly dealing with vague and unclear terms,
which, as explained below, can obstruct a forensic accountant’s findings. 78
In their article Contracts Ex Machina, Professors Kevin Werbach and
Nicolas Cornell raise a concern over the tension between traditional contract law
and “smart contracts,” for example, where the law permits parties and courts to
void contracts at times, “smart contracts” may be programmed for irrevocable
enforcement. 79 “Smart contracts” do not seem to allow for many circumstances
that arise ex post that can excuse a party from performing. Other issues include,
for example, where the Uniform Commercial Code allows for parties to
determine price at a later date than at the time the contract was made. 80 The
“unknown” formation factor is whether the “smart contract” would allow a price
change after substantial performance, or would it cancel the contract because
price had not been determined by the parties at the outset. 81
Issues involving a party’s legal capacity to enter into contracts can also be
problematic in determining intent, which normally requires a judgment made by
a jury standing outside the “smart contract” that can empathize with and
understand the parties’ circumstances. Whether a person understood what they
were doing at the time of the contract’s making is something courts measure on
the basis of the parties’ intent to be bound by the promises exchanged. 82
76
See Reggie O’Shields, Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for the Blockchain, 21 N.C. BANKING INST.
177, 179 (2017); David B. Black, Blockchain Smart Contracts Aren’t Smart and Aren’t Contracts, FORBES
(Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblack/2019/02/04/blockchain-smart-contracts-arent-smartand-arent-contracts/#4f378a4d1e6a; Jake Frankenfield, Smart Contracts, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 26, 2019), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/s/smart-contracts.asp.
77
Frankenfield, supra note 76.
78
Black, supra note 76 (positing that “smart contracts” still require human interaction and contain
“security issues”).
79
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 74, at 367–68.
80
U.C.C. § 2-305 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
81
Douglas C. Berry, David M. Byers & Daniel J. Oates, Open Price Agreements: Good Faith Pricing in
the Franchise Relationship, 27 FRANCHISE L.J., 45 (2007) (Historically, contracts without price were void for
indefiniteness. Now, contracting parties are allowed “adjustments for unforeseeable circumstances—such as
market fluctuations, changes in industries, and general uncertainty occurring over extended periods of time—
without which it would be commercially untenable for the parties to proceed.”); see also Black, supra note 76
(arguing changes cannot be made after “smart contracts” are formed because they and the blockchain where they
are stored are “immutable”).
82
See Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1439 (2009).
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“Smart contracts” also raise a concern about whether there can be a total
meeting of the minds on every provision. While parties can prove intent to enter
a “smart contract” by submitting their “private keys,” 83 or the means to
electronically “sign” or affirm a contract, there may be challenges with parties’
confusion or having a different understanding over specific contract
provisions. 84 These are just some of the issues “smart contracts” and their
functions will create for forensic accountants as they come upon them during
investigations.
In his renowned work Algorithmic Entities, Professor Lynn LoPucki posits
the notion of business entities, such as corporations and limited liability
companies, controlled by algorithms without human intervention. 85 He
discusses the work of other scholars in the field, including Professor Shawn
Bayern, who opined “anyone can confer legal personhood on an autonomous
computer algorithm merely by putting it in control of a limited liability company
(LLC). The algorithm can exercise the rights of the entity, making them
effectively rights of the algorithm.” 86 Professor LoPucki makes clear the
algorithm is not the entity, but controls and operates the entity. 87 “By definition,
the initiator of an [algorithmic entity] would neither own the entity nor control
it after launch. The initiator would, however, have the opportunity to set the
algorithm’s objectives prior to launch.” 88 Yet, it seems unclear after launch
whether a human can intervene in the programming or whether there is a
possibility for the entity to program itself.

83

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 74, at 331.
The critical distinction between smart contracts and other forms of electronic agreements is
enforcement. Once the computers determine that the requisite state has been achieved, they
automatically perform data-oriented or computable contracts. Humans can interrupt that
execution at any point. But with a smart contract, complete execution of the agreement, including
any transfer of value, occurs without any such opportunity to interrupt. Accordingly, juridical
forums are powerless to stop the execution of smart contracts–there is no room to bring an action
for breach when breach is impossible. The computers in the blockchain network ensure
performance, rather than any appendage of the state. And, because blockchains run on a
distributed network of independent nodes, with no central control point, a litigant seeking to
enjoin performance of a smart contract has no one to sue.

Id. at 331–32.
84
Black, supra note 76.
85
See Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887, 890–91 (2018).
86
Id. at 890.
87
See id. at 897.
88
Id. at 900.
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Algorithmic entities would be mobile and can exist anywhere in the world.89
Since they are computer programs, they can pass through borders and possibly
escape regulation. 90 Professor LoPucki explains algorithmic entities can either
have a positive impact on the outside world, for example, ones that are
programmed with philanthropic goals, or they can have goals with evil purposes,
such as raising money for terrorist financing or executing terrorist acts. 91
Arguably, algorithmic entities could circumvent securities and tax laws if the
programmer left it to the algorithm to maximize profits without regard to
regulation. Professor LoPucki warns of the dangers of algorithmic entities with
no human oversight: “Control of entities would allow algorithms to accumulate
wealth, leverage it in capital markets, and participate in the political process—
without being subject to the constraints under which humans operate.” 92
Even though algorithms can gather and “make decisions,” the law treats
them as property, not persons, as it does for other legal entities. 93 In the future,
they may achieve the ability to adapt to various conditions by programming and
re-programming themselves, and because of their ability to pass through borders
they will be able to escape regulation. 94 The problem for forensic accountants
and other experts in related fields is “following the money,” because an
algorithm can potentially assume any human identity or fake human identities,
or “an algorithm could generate any number of artificial entities quickly and
easily, without violating any law.” 95
Professor LoPucki, who posits algorithmic entities will be “criminally
inclined,” presents an example for deliberation:
Consider, for example, an algorithm that seeks to accumulate
resources by encrypting humans’ data and offering to decrypt it in
return for ransom payments. The algorithm may not need an entity to
commit the crime, or even to receive the payment in bitcoin. But an
89

Id. at 924.
Id. at 924–25.
91
Id. at 900.
92
Id. at 901–02.
93
Id. at 898. The law generally treats business entities as artificial persons because they are made of
individuals acting in concert toward common goals. See Nina Totenberg, When Did Companies Become People?
Excavating the Legal Evolution, NPR (July 28, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/07/28/335288388/when-didcompanies-become-people-excavating-the-legal-evolution.
94
LoPucki, supra note 85, at 924 (“Humans will have difficulty controlling AEs because AEs can migrate
across state and national borders to avoid detection and regulation. Cross-border migration can be the electronic
transfer or redistribution of an algorithm, a change in the physical location of the AE’s assets or operations, a
mere change in the entity’s registration jurisdiction, or any combination of these.”).
95
Id. at 902, 918 (“If I am correct in my prediction that AEs will be criminally inclined, AEs will soon
be poorly regarded and might have to conceal their natures to maintain access to capital markets.”).
90
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algorithm alone could not use the proceeds to buy or lease real
property, contract with legitimate businesses, open a bank account, sue
to enforce its rights, or buy stuff on Amazon and have it shipped. To
do any of those things, the algorithm would need an identity. 96

Algorithmic entities and their “super human” abilities can present challenges for
forensic accountants in many respects, from tracing money laundering to divorce
investigations, as defendants can program these entities to hide assets or even
create “collusion” among algorithmic entities to hide assets. 97 The possibility of
algorithmic entities replacing human institutions is problematic enough;
however, the possibility of them working within a decentralized global financial
system is even worse.
Now that payment systems can be decentralized due to blockchain
technology, governments are presented with new challenges to track and
regulate money transactions. 98 Under the current system, for example,
authorities can employ instruments such as the Currency Transaction Report to
safeguard against money laundering and other financial crimes. 99 Since cash is
still used, bank deposits can be better verified, and transactions can be traced
through electronic transfers between accounts. 100 Forensic accountants rely on
these systems when they are employed in fraud cases. 101
But with blockchain and the pseudo-anonymity associated with
cryptocurrency, it is more difficult for governments, or forensic accountants for
that matter, to place the same constraints and controls, because there is no bank
intermediary. Cryptocurrency is sent from digital wallet to digital wallet (an
electronic respiratory for payments, for example, ones located on a smartphone
or laptop) versus bank accounts controlled by the banking system. 102 Also,
cryptocurrency exchanges can provide digital wallets for clients and allow them
to trade currencies, making exchanges act essentially as money transmitters
without registering with a regulator. 103 On the international scale, the most

96

Id. at 902.
Id. at 903.
98
Jia Kai, Blockchain: The Regulation Challenge, PARIS INNOVATION REV. (Mar. 27, 2018), http://
parisinnovationreview.com/articles-en/blockchain-the-real-disruptions-and-challenges.
99
DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, NOTICE TO CONSUMERS: A CTR REFERENCE
GUIDE 1 (2009).
100
Id.
101
MARY-JO KRANACHER ET AL., FORENSIC ACCOUNTING AND FRAUD EXAMINATION 299 (2d ed., 2019).
102
Geoff Williams, What Is a Digital Wallet?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 21, 2019, 1:38 PM),
https://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/saving-and-budgeting/articles/what-is-a-digital-wallet.
103
See Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States:
Current Issues and Future Directions, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813, 829 (2014).
97
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difficult challenge to regulation may be the stabilization of the foreign exchange
markets, since cryptocurrencies and exchanges can fall outside the normal
regulatory framework.
Federal and state governments may not have to act to draft legislation for the
creation of algorithmic entities, since their formation is most likely possible
under current law or they can adopt existing uniform laws. 104 Professor LoPucki
posits that the Delaware General Corporation Law and various uniform laws are
amiable to their creation, including the Model Business Corporation Act, the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act,
and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. 105 Vermont took a lead role in the
creation of “blockchain-based” LLCs, or a “BBLLC,” 106 which is “a legal
structure that memorializes the liability and fiduciary duties unique to some
blockchain businesses.” 107
There is also the public policy consideration as to whether society wants
algorithms to entirely control or even partially control their companies. For
example, if there are human directors on a board in a sort of hybrid entity, the
algorithm could elect and remove human members, including directing them as
to what actions to take, exerting more power over the entity than what society
may deem proper. 108 Essentially in the wake of algorithmic entities, human roles
within private and public companies may be transformed, perhaps deleteriously,
ceding decision-making power to the algorithms, and moreover, increasing the
probability that traditional duties of care and loyalty will shift demonstrably
from human controllers to their artificial counterparts.
B. Forensic Accounting: Legal Implications Surrounding AI and Auditing
In their article The Emergence of Artificial Intelligence: How Automation is
Changing Auditing, Professors Julia Kokina and Thomas Davenport contend the
field of accounting and auditing are undergoing “fundamental change[s] due to
104
See LoPucki, supra note 85, at 906–07. A survey of eight international jurisdictions reveal their laws
are “less receptive” to algorithmic entities than the U.S. Id. at 920. None of them permit “memberless entities.”
Id. at 921. Controlling members or shareholders can be artificial entities, but in some cases natural persons are
needed to act on their behalf. Id. Generally, the concern is human beings can accept responsibility, while the
algorithm, since it is not a person, cannot. See id. at 922. “Uniform laws” are written by legal scholars to
oftentimes confront conflicting laws by proposing standards. They are not enforceable unless they are enacted
into law by a jurisdiction’s legislative and executive branches.
105
Id. at 907–12.
106
Jason Tashea, Blockchain LLC, 105 A.B.A. J. 31, 32 (2019).
107
Jason Tashea, Some States are Allowing People and Companies to Use Blockchain to Authenticate
Documents, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 2019, 1:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/best-evidence.
108
LoPucki, supra note 85, at 913.
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advances in data analytics” and AI. 109 Cloud computing and its processing
power has been helpful to accountants with “crunching” vast amounts of data. 110
The “Big Four” accounting firms have invested greatly in AI auditing programs,
and at least one source at Ernst & Young predicts college-graduate, new hires
could fall by half in the near future 111 because of the changes in technology. One
prediction is that by 2025, thirty percent of all corporate audits will be completed
by AI. 112
The authors noted current AI systems are not designed to replace human
auditors altogether, but rather are created to assist in acquiring data faster and
more accurately, allowing the auditor “more time to areas requiring higher-level
judgment.” 113 AI, through the advent of “machine learning,” is more efficient in
spotting anomalies in data, “such as an unexpected order increase in a particular
region, unusually high expense items posted by an individual, or exceptionally
favorable equipment lease terms for a supplier.” 114
Current technology automates “repetitive tasks” that a human auditor
normally undertakes, such as “digesting words and images” in contracts and
financial statements; but accounting firms are moving to “natural language
processing” to attain a “higher level” of analysis to understand a document’s
“context” and using it to create financial statements. 115 Some in the accounting
field contend that the need for human accountants is still in demand; some
acknowledge the skills accountants are taught will need to adapt to this new
technology; and some say the need for entry-level accountants may be on the
decline. 116 There is a silver-lining, however. Because AI technologies are
designed to supplant specific accounting functions instead of jobs, adoption will
be slow and less disruptive in the near-term. 117
109
Julia Kokina & Thomas H. Davenport, The Emergence of Artificial Intelligence: How Automation Is
Changing Auditing,14 J. EMERGING TECH. ACCT. 115, 115 (2017).
110
Id. at 116.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 115 (“There are also many situations today in which a traditional human approach to analytics
and decision-making is simply impossible. These decisions need to be made with too much data and in too short
a time for humans to be employed in the process. Digital advertising, medical diagnosis, predictive maintenance
for industrial equipment, and a detailed audit of all company transactions fall into this category.”).
113
Id. at 117.
114
Id. at 117.
115
Id. at 118. The authors also acknowledge the possibility of the “singularity,” where AI could reach the
level of “self-awareness,” “formulating goals and objectives [and] using imagination.” Id. at 119. But they also
note researchers have opined that if it is destined to happen it will not be for at least a hundred years. Id. Since
the AI could never possess a “soul” as humans do, the notion that AI could develop “personhood” and reflect on
itself the same way humans can would not be possible.
116
Id. at 120.
117
Id.
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The authors predict “remaining jobs” for accountants include acting as
overseers of AI technology and, more pertinent to the subject of this Essay,
“[c]arrying out tasks that are now impossible with AI-based computers,
including cultivating internal and external clients, interpreting audit and
financial results for senior managers and boards of directors.” 118 The relevance
of the latter as it relates to forensic accountants is not only that human
accountants are needed to interpret AI results to senior management, but they
are also needed to explain information garnered from AI to juries.
Kokina and Davenport recognize the problem of “bias in AI and whether
humans using AI applications can engage in appropriate judgment and decisionmaking.” 119 They warn against the “lack of objectivity” in AI systems since they
can “reflect the biases of humans who create or interact with them.” 120 The
authors describe three types of biases. 121 “Data-driven bias” can affect bias-free
outcomes because the data the AI is examining can be flawed and skewed. 122
There is also “emergent bias” or the bias occurring “when machines shield
humans from conflicting points of view while providing them with information
that confirms their preferences or beliefs.” 123 Lastly, “conflicting-goals bias is
an unforeseen bias that occurs as a result of a stereotype-driven human
interaction with the system.” 124
Finally, Kokina and Davenport also call attention to the “black box”
problem, where it may be “impossible” even for experts to interpret the inner
functions of the AI. 125 Because of the “black box” phenomena, they seem to cast
doubt that AI will completely displace the need for human judgment: “Until such
technologies are made more transparent, it may be difficult for regulatory
bodies, accounting firms, and audited organizations to turn over decisions and
judgments to them.” 126

118
Id. (“It has already been noted that many accounting programs do not currently prepare students for
such roles. In addition, since many of the remaining tasks will require an understanding of the client’s business
and the ability to communicate effectively with clients, job roles that persist will probably be held by those
accountants with substantial experience.” (citations omitted)).
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
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III. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE DAUBERT RULE TO INCLUDE STANDARDS
ADDRESSING AI AND FORENSIC EXPERT TESTIMONY
Science and technology have made their way into the legal system to help
safeguard the natural rights protected in the Constitution. There is no question
AI will transform the forensic professions as it will the courts. AI, however,
should not be made to replace human expert opinion and human judgment as to
legal liability, because AI and humans arrive at conclusions differently.
Humans make decisions in two general ways. 127 One is “intuition,” where
humans rely on past experiences including “gut feelings” and instinct, which
guide their judgments. 128 The other is the power of logical reasoning. 129 Human
beings are able to reflect on both concrete and abstract things using logical
reasoning or a “conscious process,” and to come to understand the truth of what
they are contemplating and experiencing. 130 But the process takes time. 131
Forensic accountants, “as expert decision makers, use both ways of thinking—
they apply their knowledge to specific situations to make reasoned decisions,
but also make quick intuitive decisions based on extensive experience in their
field.” 132
On the other hand, AI programmers are concerned more with “replicating
human abilities” through “pattern recognition” or “machine learning,” rather
than a deliberative process. 133 Major strengths of machine learning versus
human learning are: (1) machines can process large amounts of data; (2)
machines can find “weaker or more complex patterns in data” and work better
in “less predictable” environments; and (3) machines can be more “consistent
decision makers” because they are less susceptible to cognitive bias. 134 Major
weaknesses include: (1) lack of model flexibility; (2) not all problems have the
correct data “to learn”; (3) data reflects bias in the real world; (4) not every
problem can be solved with mathematical analysis, which is the only output with
machine learning applications; and (5) other considerations must be “factored

127
ICAEW IT FACULTY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE FUTURE OF ACCOUNTANCY 5 (2018); see
also AUSTIN FAGOTHY, S.J., RIGHT AND REASON 94 (3d ed., 1963) (“We distinguish two uses of reason: reason
rationally exercised, consistent with itself, faithful to its own law and function; and reason irrationally exercised,
contradicting itself, enthralled by a law foreign to it and functioning to its own destruction.”).
128
See ICAEW IT FACULTY, supra note 127, at 5.
129
Id.
130
See id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
See id.
134
Id. at 6.
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into decisions,” including privacy issues, that AI may not be able to address the
same way humans can. 135 Therefore, AI has its positive uses, but only a human
expert can make that unique, psychological connection with the jury.
A. Rule 702 Should Be Amended to Include Reliability Requirements for AI
and Reestablish the Role of the Human Expert Witness
Congress should amend Rule 702 to include reliability requirements 136 for
AI; however, it should also ensure human expert testimony can be assisted by
AI—not completely replaced by it. The emergence of AI purports radical
changes to the legal system; therefore, the current rules need to be amended to
put its influence into perspective. Jurors might be swayed into accepting AI at
face value, without considering its limitations. Moreover, parties must be
permitted to impeach the trustworthiness of AI, which is a right consistent with
the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. Judges will still perform their
gatekeeping functions, but without a change to the rules there is the danger of
inconsistent decisions throughout the federal circuits, as to which AI processes
are admissible and which are not. Standards changing from court-to-court
concerning a technology that weighs so heavily on conclusions of fact run afoul
of the notions of fundamental fairness and fair play embedded in the natural
rights protected by the Constitution.
Vermont took an initial step by amending its court rules to account for AI in
record keeping and verification. Although the rules do not completely cover all
AI, “the Vermont Supreme Court included blockchain in the state’s rules of
evidence for the first time.” 137 For forensic accounting experts and others relying
upon blockchain records, “the Vermont rules now presume a digital record
registered on a blockchain is self-authenticating and admissible when
accompanied by a written declaration by a qualified person. It also puts business
records held on the blockchain under the business records exception for
hearsay.” 138 Wyoming also created “new laws exclud[ing] virtual currency from
money transmitter rules, defin[ing] some tokens—means to access a
blockchain—as outside of securities regulations and allow[ing] for electronic
networks to be used in the creation and maintenance of corporate records.” 139
Furthermore, “Arizona and Ohio both passed laws verifying that signatures,
135
Id. at 7. “Data volumes and quality are crucial to the success of AI systems. Without enough good data,
models will simply not be able to learn.” Id. at 9.
136
See Roth, supra note 68, at 1981–82.
137
See Tashea, supra note 107.
138
Id.
139
See Tashea, supra note 106.
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documents and contracts stored on a blockchain are valid legal instruments. In
2017, Delaware amended its corporation law to allow businesses to maintain
records on a blockchain.” 140
Although forensic accountants will rely more upon AI systems, they should
never be replaced as a conduit between the evidence and the jury. Forensic
accountants, however, may be required under revised federal rules to confirm
the AI outputs they rely upon in their findings. This may be an impossible task
given the situation where the AI system a forensic accountant uses shrouds its
processes within a “black box,” leaving the forensic accountant without a way
to explain how the AI determined its conclusions. 141
As a result, the rules should also be amended to permit a court discretion to
determine testimony inadmissible in either a case where: (1) a judge cannot take
judicial notice of an AI process; or (2) where a party has not proffered an
engineer to assist in explaining the AI’s processes to a jury; or (3) where the AI
has reached a point that “black box” processes cannot be explained by human
testimony, because AI has adapted the ability to program itself. At that point,
some of the AI information forensic accountants relied upon in their reports and
testimony may be ruled to be unreliable and inadmissible. 142
B. Forensic Experts Are Still Necessary to Juries to Provide “Reasonableness
Checks” Against AI Conclusions and to Explain AI’s Limitations
Juries will still need the aid of a forensic expert to explain how the AI arrived
at its conclusions and the extent of its limitations. In the case of forensic
accounting expert testimony, traditional forensic accounting techniques can and
will be used as “reasonableness checks” against AI (machine learning, etc.)
outcomes. For example, AI estimates that during a given year a company will
have, due to a breach of contract, future lost profits of $2,000,000 for four
months from September to December. In the prior year, the company reported
net income of $10,000,000. During the year of the breach, however, net income
actually falls to $8,000,000.
In comparison to AI’s assumption, the actual loss of income for those four
months is $2,666,667 [$8,000,000 x (4 months/12 months)]. Therefore, the AI
number appears to be reasonable because it is very close to the actual amount
(approximately 75% accurate in the example). A forensic accountant presents to
140
141
142

See Tashea, supra note 107.
See Roth, supra note 68, at 1983.
Id.
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a jury the detailed review of the monthly activity, namely the months from
September to December. Based on the forensic accountant’s assessment, the jury
can find the AI’s calculation reasonable, because the traditional techniques
presented by the forensic accounting expert would validate the AI outcome. But
if the results of multiple, traditional forensic accounting tools yielded different
results, then AI is unlikely to hold up and the jury could take that into account
during its deliberations.
Another reason human expert testimony is still relevant and necessary is to
explain to a jury the limitations of new technologies. Assume, for example, Bad
Actor, a perpetrator of a fraud, told unsuspecting investors their investments
would yield a 28% return each year. Bad Actor told them their investment was
“no risk” because it was guaranteed by a major bank, but they must send $10,000
worth of some altcoin that obfuscates tracking, and transmit it to Bad Actor’s
digital wallet, which is not located on a cryptocurrency exchange. If AI were
used to try and track that payment and it was unsuccessful, a forensic accountant
will still be needed to explain to the jury why the AI was unable to track it.
AI outcomes must also endure the process of cross-examination and be
subjected to it. But this requires an opposing human expert. If the AI methods
and processes appear inaccurate, opposing counsel will attack those conclusions
and the trier of fact will likely side with the results of more traditional
approaches developed by human experts that use tools and techniques supported
by the evidence where the results can be explained.
CONCLUSION
Forensic accountants, as well as other forensic experts, will undoubtedly
encounter AI in their practices and it may take on a more prominent role within
their investigations. Blockchain technology, cryptocurrency, “smart contracts”
and the prospect of algorithmic entities will present new challenges to the
forensic accounting field, which may require training in these areas. This Essay
presents some of the challenges AI will present under the current rules of
evidence. Future research should include how these technologies will be used
by forensic accounting experts and experts of other disciplines to explain or
support their findings to a jury, and how courts will resolve the potential for AI
bias in these technologies. Other areas for future research could include the role
of transparency in dealing with “black box” issues and the legal tools parties can
use to challenge the veracity of AI data mining or the methodology it uses to
calculate damages.
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It is dubious to presume technology can replace judges, attorneys, experts,
and juries in determining liability. AI can assist the forensic accounting
profession in many ways, but it cannot substitute the expert’s testimonial role.
Society should never accept the possibility that AI could replace the human role
in the legal system. Only human beings should bear the responsibility of
dispensing justice upon another human being, or even an entity run by human
beings, like a corporation.
The law is reacting to the changes in technology, but it is improbable AI will
replace the need to have human expert witnesses explaining evidence to juries.
Judges, for example, are also relying on AI systems to predict recidivism rates
among defendants and sentence accordingly. Yet, a major societal concern is the
probability that algorithmic bias can enter into a judge’s calculus, casting doubt
on the legal system’s fairness. 143
Society should never accept AI as the ultimate arbiter of legal liability.
Nevertheless, AI does serve the function of assisting juries in coming to better
decisions, because of its efficiency in data processing. Juries will still be called
upon to weigh the reliability of AI used in forensic accounting expert’s analyses
and judge accordingly. As a result, Congress should amend the current evidence
rules to account for reliability in AI processes and uniformity in court standards,
but it should not permit AI to completely replace human expert testimony.
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See Annie Dike, Would You Trust an Artificially-Intelligent Expert?, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/would-you-trust-artificially-intelligent-expert.

